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Abstract—With the energy transition, grid congestion is in-
creasingly becoming a problem. This paper proposes the imple-
mentation of fairness in congestion management by presenting
quantitative fair optimization goals and fairness measuring tools.
Furthermore, this paper presents a congestion management
solution in the form of an egalitarian allocation mechanism.
Finally, this paper proves that this mechanism is truthful, pareto
efficient, and maximizes a fair optimization goal.
I. INTRODUCTION
The energy system is going through a transition. This
energy transition is brought about by an increasing penetration
of renewable energy sources and a push towards a more
decentralized system. With these developments, congestion on
electrical grid lines is becoming a more widespread problem
[1]; one that is not easily solved using storage [2]. The inter-
mittent nature of renewable energy resources, the decentralized
nature of consumers and producers (often prosumers now), and
the intensive disruptive demand introduced by electric vehicles
and heat pumps all contribute to grid congestion issues.
According to a study concerning the German electrical grid;
“over the past five years, the costs for congestion management
and curtailment have increased by a factor of ten, to about one
billion euro per year.” [3].
Grid congestion management solutions appear in various
forms and address different aspects of grid congestion prob-
lems [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. However, while grid constraints raise
questions concerning priority when conflicts of use arise, these
studies on congestion management do not take into account
an explicit notion of fairness. A recent package of measures
presented by the European Commission states that “energy
is a critical good, absolutely essential for full participation
in modern society. The clean energy transition also needs
to be fair for those sectors, regions or vulnerable parts of
society affected by the energy transition.” [9]. In light of this
statement, the incorporation of fairness is left insufficiently
covered by grid congestion management research.
The incorporation of fairness in grid congestion manage-
ment is no straightforward task. Notions of fairness are fun-
damentally subjective, and accepted notions of fairness do not
necessarily translate from one setting to another. Moreover,
other goals such as efficiency may take precedence over fair-
ness, limiting the scope of fairness that can be implemented.
Once a notion of fairness has been accepted for a certain
setting, it can serve one or more of the following three main
uses:
• As a binary descriptor; it is expressed qualitatively and
its definition either is or is not satisfied by a situation.
• As a tool for maximizing fairness; it is expressed quan-
titatively and may be used as an optimization goal for
fairness and other qualities.
• To compare and evaluate situations; it is expressed quan-
titatively, preferably normalized, and measures fairness
independent of other qualities.
This paper proposes two implementations of fairness suit-
able for congestion management in electrical grids. Both of
these implementations will be of the quantitative type and
may be used as an optimization goal or a measure of fairness.
The first implementation of fairness that this paper proposes is
based on the Nash product that was introduced by Nash [10]
and closely resembles the notion of social welfare. The second
implementation of fairness that this paper proposes is based on
research in behavioral economics by Fehr and Schmidt [11],
and mimics the inequity-based comparative utility (inequality
between agents negatively affects their utilities) that is ob-
served in humans.
Furthermore, this paper presents a congestion management
solution in the form of an egalitarian allocation mechanism.
Based on consumer data, this mechanism allocates consump-
tion limits to individual consumers in order to resolve con-
gestion in acyclic networks. Finally, this paper proves that the
presented mechanism is truthful and maximizes both the social
welfare and Nash product.
II. SETTING AND NOTATION
Consider a network N , represented by a graph (N,L).
Prosumers p, i.e. agents that may either produce or consume at
any given time, are located at the vertices n ∈ N called nodes.
The edges represent electrical grid lines l ∈ L with positive
capacity constraints Cl that constrain the power flow over the
line l. A connection to an external network may be represented
by an edge associated with only one vertex. Prosumption of a
prosumer p is represented by an activity ap, with positive and
negative activity corresponding to consumption and production
respectively. Let P denote the set of all prosumers in the
network, and let P+ and P− denote the subsets of consumers
and producers, respectively.
When congestion occurs, i.e. at least one of the line capacity
constraints Cl is exceeded by the power flow over that line, a
congestion management mechanism resolves the congestion.
It does so by finding an allocation A: a set of activities ap for
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Fig. 1. An example network of five prosumers. Allocation 1 is as shown,
while allocation 2 differs by instead setting a4 = 9 and a5 = 5.
the prosumers p ∈ P . As a result, for some prosumers p, there
will be a difference between the prosumer’s reported desired
activity, referred to as the type θp, and its final activity ap. A
reported desired consumption, i.e. θp > 0, must always result
in a final activity 0 ≤ ap ≤ θp. Similarly for production.
Each prosumer p has a utility function up that depends on
the activity ap, the valuation of the activity vp(ap), the price
of the activity λp(ap), and the type θp. This paper assumes
a setting in which, for a network of limited size, the price
function λp is identical for all prosumers p and scales linearly
with the activity ap. Furthermore, the valuation function vp
is identical for all prosumers p and scales linearly with the
activity ap. Therefore, in this setting, the utility function up
only depends on at most the activity ap and type θp.
III. FAIRNESS OPTIMIZATION AND MEASUREMENT
A common way to optimize allocations of a divisible good
to a set of agents, is to maximize the social welfare (SW). This
means maximizing the sum over all agents’ utilities:
max
A∈S
∑
P
up(A). (1)
Here, S denotes the solution set: the set of allocations that
resolve congestion and assign consumption and production
exclusively to consumers and producers respectively, bounded
by their types, as described in Section II.
Since fairness is an inter-agent concept, SW cannot take
fairness into consideration without explicitly incorporating it
in the individual utility functions; Section IV further considers
this option.
An alternative optimization goal is the Nash product (NP):
max
A∈S
∏
P
up(A). (2)
This optimization problem, like the SW optimization in (1),
maximizes all prosumers’ utilities, within S. However, unlike
in (1), the NP optimization in (2) also maximizes the minimal
utility among prosumers, within S. The differences are illus-
trated with the help of a running example, shown in Figure 1.
Taking the simplest utility function for each prosumer p, i.e.
up = |ap|, (3)
the SW and NP values associated with the two allocations
presented in Figure 1 are displayed in Table I. Table I shows
that the SW approach does not differentiate between the two
allocations, while the NP takes a higher value when the
Allocation 1 Allocation 2
SW
∑ |ap| 35 35
NP
∏ |ap| 16807 15435
ASW 1
n
∑ |ap| 7 7
ANP n
√∏ |ap| 7 6.88
NNP n
√∏
ap/θp 0.7 0.69
TABLE I
SOCIAL WELFARE AND NASH PRODUCT VALUES FOR THE TWO
ALLOCATIONS PRESENTED IN FIGURE 1.
allocated activities are closer to each other. Note that both
allocations yield the same total consumption.
In order to have the SW and NP not only serve as an
optimization goal but also as a measure, i.e. an indicator
independent of irrelevant qualities, the average is taken. This
eliminates their dependency on the size of the system. For the
average Nash product (ANP), the optimization then takes the
following form:
max
A∈S
n
√∏
P
up(A), (4)
where n is the number of prosumers in P . Note that taking the
average does not affect the optimization problem. The values
of the averaged social welfare (ASW, see Table I) and ANP on
the two allocations presented in Figure 1 are also displayed in
Table I.
The ANP, however, still depends on the absolute level of
prosumption. This dependency can be removed by considering
utility functions that reflect the relative activity instead of the
absolute activity, that is
up = ap/θp. (5)
This results in the normalized Nash product (NNP) that takes
values between 0 and 1. Since the NNP is largely independent
of qualities other than fairness, it is well suited as a measure of
fairness. The values that the NNP takes on the two allocations
presented in Figure 1 are displayed in Table I as well.
The downside of the relative utility function (5) is that
its value is influenced to a large extent by the type of the
prosumer. This means that a prosumer p intentionally reporting
a large type θp affects the value of the ANP significantly.
Moreover, it skews the optimization problem to allocate a
potentially disproportionate amount of activity to such a
prosumer p. Thus, while the NNP provides a fine measuring
tool, the absolute utility function (3) is better suited as an
optimization goal.
IV. COMPARATIVE UTILITY AND NETWORK TOPOLOGY
An alternative approach to incorporating fairness in con-
gestion management, is to explicitly include a notion of
fairness in the individual utility functions of the prosumers p.
Research in behavioral economics by Fehr and Schmidt [11]
θ1 : 10
a1 : 8
35
θ2 : 10
a2 : 930
θ3 : 10
a3 : 7
25
θ4 : 10
a4 : 8
20 θ5 : 3a5 : 315
Fig. 2. The example network with the type of one prosumer lowered.
proposes a model aimed at capturing fairness-related behaviour
in humans, specifically inequity-aversion. Their findings can
be used to construct utility functions for software agents that
closely resemble the inherent human notions of fairness.
Taking P = P+, the utility function presented in [11] takes
the following form:
up = ap − α
n− 1
∑
s6=p
∆as,p
− β
n− 1
∑
s6=p
∆ap,s,
(6)
where ∆ai,j = max(ai − aj , 0) is the positive difference
between ai and aj . The restriction P = P+, i.e. that
all prosumers are consumers, will later be extended to the
case that includes both consumers and producers. The utility
function is similar when instead taking P = P−.
The utility function (6) takes into account comparative
equity; it adds two terms that compare the activity of the
prosumer with the activity of all other prosumers in the
network. The first term measures the utility loss from envy,
i.e. others consuming more, while the second term measures
the utility loss from pity, i.e. others consuming less. The
parameters α and β represent the levels of envy and pity,
leading to the reasonable assumptions that
0 ≤ α, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, β ≤ α. (7)
Since the comparative equity utility (6) explicitly considers
the relation of prosumers to each other, it can simply be used
with the SW optimization (1) to find a fair allocation. There
are, however, a number of aspects unique to the congestion
problem setting that demand adjustments to the comparative
equity utility function as presented in (6).
Figure 2 presents a slightly modified version of the example
network. The presented allocation includes inequalities among
prosumers that are not clearly detrimental to its fairness.
Prosumer 5 is allocated a significantly lower activity, but its
activity a5 equals its type θ5. This means that prosumer 5 is
perfectly content, and is thus unlikely to envy other prosumers.
Likewise, if the other prosumers have knowledge of prosumer
5’s type, it is unlikely that they will pity prosumer 5.
These situations can be taken into account by adding a
factor that signifies how discontent a prosumer p is with
their allocated activity ap relative to their type θp. Since it
is unlikely that a prosumer p will pity another prosumer for
not being allocated an activity that prosumer p wanted but
was not allocated itself, the discontent factor applied to the
pity term should take this matter of perspective into account.
Fig. 3. NCSW corresponding to the allocation presented in figure 2.
The result is comparative discontent equity (CDE) utility:
up = ap − α
n− 1
∑
s6=p
θp − ap
θp
·∆as,p
− β
n− 1
∑
s6=p
min(θs, ap)− as
min(θs, ap)
·∆ap,s.
(8)
If, in the situation under consideration, prosumers do not have
(full) information about other prosumers’ types, then the pity
term should be dropped altogether.
In order to normalize the SW when CDE utility is used,
instead of taking the ASW as suggested in Section III, the SW
is divided by the sum of activities. This results in normalized
comparative social welfare (NCSW):∑
P up∑
P ap
(9)
Figure 3 depicts the NCSW corresponding to the allocation
presented in figure 2 for different values of α and β, showing
how prosumers’ characteristics determine perceived fairness.
Note that when envy and pity do not play a role, i.e. both α
and β are zero, the NCSW takes its maximum value of 1.
NCSW is a suitable fairness measurement; normalized, in-
dependent of other qualities, and customizable through the
parameters α and β. However, it applies only to groups
of exclusively consumers (or producers) and does not take
network topology into account.
When prosumers in the network both consume and produce,
an adjustment of NCSW is required. Since consumers do
not compete for network capacity with producers and vice
versa, neither envy nor pity between the two is expected.
Thus, for each consumer, the envy and pity terms in CDE
utility should sum over only all other consumers. Similarly,
the producers only compare themselves to all other producers.
For a consumer, this exclusive comparative discontent equity
(ECDE) utility takes the form
up = ap − α|P+| − 1
∑
s∈P+\{p}
θp − ap
θp
·∆as,p
− β|P+| − 1
∑
s∈P+\{p}
min(θs, ap)− as
min(θs, ap)
·∆ap,s.
(10)
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Fig. 4. The example network with only one side congested.
Besides the mode of prosumption, the network topology
may also play a role in determining the set of prosumers that
any prosumer compares itself to. Figure 4 presents a version
of the example network that is only congested on one side.
This is an interesting situation: although all prosumers have
the same type and prosumers 2 and 3 on the non-congested
side have been allocated more activity, a reduction of their
activity cannot improve the situation for prosumers 4 and 5
on the congested side. In principle, prosumers 4 and 5 would
not envy prosumers 2 and 3. This raises the question of the
topological reach of comparative equity.
A possible approach to capturing this topological separation
in the utility is to define regions in the network with subsets of
prosumers associated to them. Prosumers from a certain subset
could then have different α values depending on whether
comparing to a prosumer from their own subset, or a prosumer
from another subset. For example, for the network depicted in
figure 4, the utility function for prosumer 4 could be
u4 = a4 − α · θ4 − a4
θ4
·∆a5,4
−β · min(θ5, a4)− a5
min(θ5, a4)
·∆a4,5
−α
′
3
∑
s∈{1,2,3}
θ4 − a4
θ4
·∆as,4
−β
′
3
∑
s∈{1,2,3}
min(θs, a4)− as
min(θs, a4)
·∆a4,s,
(11)
with α > α′ and β > β′. This type of specific comparative dis-
content equity (SCDE) utility function that allows different α
and β values when comparing to different groups is adaptable
to the distribution of population and capacity constraints of
the network under consideration. For instance, to distinguish
groups of prosumers by region or type (e.g. hospitals).
In summary, ECDE utility makes a fair optimization goal
with SW and a fairness measure with NCSW that both mimic
notions of fairness inherent to humans. When required, SCDE
utility may be used as a flexible way to accommodate network
constraints and other attributes.
V. CONGESTION MANAGEMENT MECHANISM
In this section, a congestion management mechanism is
proposed in algorithmic form. Consider an acyclic network
where all prosumers are consumers with simple utility (3). The
mechanism allocates activities ap to prosumers p based on the
network topology and the prosumers’ types θp. The resulting
allocation A is in the solution set S: it resolves congestion
and allocated activities are bounded by prosumer types. Most
real-world local energy networks can be represented by such
an acyclic model.
The acyclic network is interpreted as a rooted tree with
its root connected to an external network. Let Tn denote the
subtree of node n and denote the line from node n directed
towards the root as line n. Thus, any node n has a capacity
Cn associated with it that limits the flow from the subtree Tn
towards the root of the network (or, in case of the root node,
towards the external network).
The allocation mechanism, presented in figure 5, takes an
egalitarian approach: when congestion occurs at a line n,
all consumers in the subtree Tn have the upper bound for
their activities reduced to the same level. As a consequence,
consumers with the lowest activity only have their activity
reduced when all other consumers in the subtree Tn have their
activity reduced to that same level.
ALLOCATION MECHANISM
1: Initialize ap = θp for all p ∈ P
2: while not all nodes are marked do
3: Select unmarked node n with no
unmarked children and mark it
4: if total consumption of the subtree Tn
exceeds the capacity constraint Cn then
5: Select value v such that
∑
p∈Tn min(v, ap) = Cn
6: Set ap = min(v, ap) for all p in the subtree Tn
7: end if
8: end while
9: return A = {ap | p ∈ P}
Fig. 5. The egalitarian congestion management mechanism.
Proposition 1. The set of activities ap allocated by the
allocation mechanism to the prosumers p given their types
θp maximizes the social welfare (SW) on the solution set S.
Proof. Consider a prosumer p and the final value ap. If
ap = θp, then the utility of prosumer p is maximal within
the solution set S and cannot be changed to improve the SW.
If ap 6= θp, then, since all prosumers in the network are
consumers, ap < θp. Let n be the last node where ap was
reduced. This means that the prosumer p is located in the
subtree Tn for which, after executing lines 4 – 6, it holds that∑
s∈Tn
as = Cn. (12)
Since the activity ap has not been reduced since node n and it
was maximal among activities of prosumers in Tn, it follows
that none of the activities of prosumers in Tn have changed
since node n.
Now consider a nonempty set V ⊂ P with ap < θp ∀p ∈ V
and a set E = {p | p ∈ V } of corresponding activity increases
with 0 < p ≤ θp− ap ∀p ∈ V . Let L denote the set of nodes
where at least one of the prosumers p ∈ V had their activity
ap last reduced. Since equation (12) holds for all nodes n ∈ L,
the activity increases E cause congestion at all those nodes.
Let W = P \ V and let D = {−δs | s ∈ W} be a set of
corresponding activity decreases with 0 ≤ δs ≤ as ∀s ∈ W .
For each n ∈ L, to resolve congestion caused by E, it must
hold that
∑
s∈Wn δs ≥
∑
p∈Vn p, where Vn and Wn are the
subsets of V and W in Tn. If such D does not exist, then the
set of activities increased by E is not in the solution set S.
Since V is the disjoint union
⊎
n∈K Vn for some K ⊂ L,
it follows that
∑
p∈V p −
∑
s∈W δs ≤ 0. Therefore, the SW
cannot be improved by changing any number of activities.
As demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 1, for no single
prosumer p can the utility ap be improved within the solution
set S. This entails the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The set of activities ap allocated by the allo-
cation mechanism to the prosumers p given their types θp is
pareto efficient on the solution set S.
Proposition 2. The set of activities ap allocated by the
allocation mechanism to the prosumers p given their types
θp maximizes the Nash product (NP) on the solution set S.
Proof. Taking the same approach as in the proof of Proposition
1, for each n ∈ L, it holds that ∑p∈Vn p −∑s∈Wn δs ≤ 0.
Note that maximizing the NP is equivalent to maximizing
log(NP) =
∑
p∈P log(ap). Adding the changes E and D gives
log(NP′) =
∑
p∈V
log(ap + p) +
∑
s∈W
log(as − δs), (13)
which, since log(x) is strictly concave, is strictly smaller than
log(NP)+
∑
p∈V
p
ap
−∑s∈W δsas . For all n ∈ L, by line 6, the
value vn selected at line 5 satisfies ap = vn for each p ∈ Vn
with activity last reduced at n, and as ≤ vn for each s ∈Wn.
Hence, for all n ∈ L with no descendants in L it follows that∑
p∈Vn
p
ap
−
∑
s∈Wn
δs
as
≤ 1
vn
( ∑
p∈Vn
p −
∑
s∈Wn
δs
)
≤ 0. (14)
Then since vm ≥ vn for all ascendants m ∈ L of n ∈ L,
the middle term of (14) increases when replacing vn with vm.
Using this, (14) can then be applied to all m ∈ L. It follows
that NP′ (NP with E and D) is strictly smaller than NP.
Important to any mechanism incorporating fairness is that
the mechanism is truthful. This means that for the prosumers,
reporting their true type is a weakly dominant strategy; i.e.
prosumers cannot benefit from strategizing and misreporting.
Proposition 3. The allocation mechanism is truthful.
Proof. Consider a prosumer p and their true desired activity
θ∗p . If reporting θp = θ
∗
p yields a final activity ap < θ
∗
p ,
then there is a last node n where ap was reduced to resolve
congestion. Therefore, reporting any θp > ap would also cause
congestion at node n and result in the same final activity
ap. Moreover, reporting any θp ≤ ap would result in a final
activity θp since ap had already been sufficiently reduced to
resolve any congestion.
Therefore, reporting θp = θ∗p is a weakly dominant strategy
for maximizing ap within S. This proves the proposition.
Propositions 1, 2, and 3 provide a strong result concerning
the allocation mechanism: given the specific problem setting,
it provides a truthful and pareto efficient congestion manage-
ment solution that optimizes egalitarian fairness within the
constraints of the network topology.
The worst case computational complexity occurs when the
mechanism must determine a value v at line 5 by sorting all k
prosumers in O(k · log(k)) time, and must do this at each of
the m nodes. Hence, the worst case computational complexity
is O(m · k · log(k)), where k and m are the total number of
prosumers and nodes in the network, respectively.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed both the normalized Nash product and
comparative discontent equity utilities combined with social
welfare as fair optimization goals and normalized fairness
measuring tools. Furthermore, this paper presented a con-
gestion management solution in the form of an egalitarian
allocation mechanism. Finally, the allocation mechanism was
proven to be truthful and maximize both social welfare and
the Nash product.
Future work could provide a congestion management solu-
tion based on the human-inspired concepts of fairness pre-
sented in Section IV, or extend the allocation mechanism
presented in Section V to more general settings.
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